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9.1  Introduction 
The Swedish labor market experienced a dramatic change in the early 
1990s. The overall unemployment rate was 1.5 percent in 1989 and 1.6  per- 
cent in 1990. By  1993, the unemployment rate had increased to 8.2 percent. 
Since then unemployment has remained high (8.1 percent in  1996). The 
slump induced a sharp expansion of various labor market programs; the 
number of people in programs increased from 1 percent of the labor force 
in 1990 to 5 percent in 1994. Most program participants are classified as 
being out of the labor force, so a mirror image of these developments was 
a substantial fall in labor force participation ratios (from 87 to 80 percent 
for males and 82 to 76 percent for females). The employment-population 
ratio fell by over 10 percentage points during the same period, from 83.1 
percent in 1990 to 72.6 percent in 1993 and 71.6 percent in 1996. 
The sources of the steep fall in employment have been discussed else- 
where, and we  do not attempt to summarize or contribute to this debate 
here. Suffice it to say that macroeconomic shocks played an important 
role, partly driven by  external forces (such as higher real interest rates) 
and partly by internal policy failures. In addition to the macroeconomic 
shocks that hit the economy in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, a num- 
ber of plausible supply-side factors, such as an increasingly generous un- 
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employment insurance system, may have caused some trend rise in the 
equilibrium unemployment rate over the past three decades. 
It is well known that the burden of unemployment is not shared equally 
among people; the young and the less skilled are particularly  prone to 
unemployment. The present paper is concerned with the labor market ex- 
perience of Swedish youths during the 1980s and the 1990s. The first ob- 
jective is to portray early economic attainment among young Swedes. We 
make use of two data sets with information on labor market outcomes 
and education  among school leavers. Are parental resources and early 
educational choices crucial for school leavers' success in the labor market 
and in the educational system? Are there distinct differences between the 
patterns prevailing in the years of boom in the late 1980s and the years of 
slump in the 1990s? Has the slump been particularly costly for disadvan- 
taged youths?' 
The second objective of the paper is to examine the impact of labor 
market programs on youth employment. The sharp deterioration of the 
labor market situation in the 1990s has been met by  an unprecedented 
increase in various active labor market programs, such as educational pro- 
grams and measures to put people into work (or worklike activities). Sev- 
eral programs have been explicitly targeted at unemployed youths. What 
is the impact of these programs on regular youth employment? We  use 
panel data on employment by Swedish municipalities to examine to what 
extent the programs crowd out regular employment. 
9.2  Youth Employment and Unemployment in Sweden 
Youth relative wages increased substantially in Sweden between the late 
1960s and the mid-l980s, along with a sharp decline in overall wage dif- 
ferentials. The ratio between hourly wages of 18-1 9-year-olds and wages 
of 35-44-year-olds  stood at 0.55 in 1968 and had increased to 0.80 in 1986. 
After  1986 there has been a modest drop in relative wages among teen- 
agers. Relative wages among 20-25-year-olds have been much more stable 
around 80 percent, with a minor increase between  1968 and 1974. The 
causes of pay compression in Sweden have been explored elsewhere. In 
our view, they have to be found in fundamental demand and supply forces 
as well  as egalitarian wage policies pursued by  the strong trade unions. 
(See Edin and Holmlund 1995 for further details and discussion.) 
To the extent that the rise in youth relative wages has been institution- 
ally driven one would expect adverse employment responses. To what ex- 
tent,  then,  are there  signs  of  deteriorating  labor  market  outcomes for 
Swedish youths? Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the period of marked 
pay compression in  Sweden from the late  1960s to the mid-1980s does 
1. For discussions of the youth labor market before the downturn in the 1990s, see, e.g., 
Schroder (1995), Blomskog (1997). and Blomskog and Schroder (1997). The Swedish Youth Labor Market in Boom and Depression  359 
not seem have been accompanied by substantially increasing inequality in 
employment outcomes. 
There is evidence of  some trend deterioration in youth labor market 
performance, however. From the mid-1960s to the early 1980s there was a 
trend increase in youth unemployment rates and also a trend increase in 
youth relative to adult unemployment. Youth participation in labor mar- 
ket programs increased substantially in the mid- 1980s. For example, over 
10 percent of the 16-19-year-old  population were engaged in public em- 
ployment programs in 1984. Program activity declined rapidly, however, 
during the strong labor market improvement of the late 1980s. 
A comparison between the structure of employment and unemployment 
in 1970 and in 1990 is sufficient to capture the main trends over the 1970s 
and the  1980s; these two years are characterized by  a very tight  labor 
market with very low unemployment (1.4 percent in 1970 and 1.6 percent 
in 1990). The unemployment rate among 18-24-year-olds  increased from 
2.5 to 3.5 percent between 1970 and 1990 (table 9.1). There was a substan- 
tial increase in the youth employment-population rate, primarily driven by 
rising labor force participation among young women. School enrollment 
among teenagers increased  as senior high  school was extended. Rising 
school enrollment has made teenage labor force participants an increas- 
ingly selected group with  relatively  low educational  attainment, which 
contributes to relatively high unemployment. 
Youth unemployment skyrocketed as a slump hit the Swedish economy 
in the early 1990s. Overall unemployment increased from  1.6 percent to 
8.2 percent between  1990 and 1993 and has remained  stubbornly high. 
Unemployment among 18-24-year-olds increased from 3.5 to 19.1 percent 
during the same three-year period. The overall employment-population 
ratio declined by  10 percentage points, whereas the youth employment 
rate declined by no less than 25 percentage points. There has also been a 
substantial increase in school enrollment, including activities organized as 
active labor market policies. We will return to a discussion of these policies 
in section 9.4. Suffice here to note that they were traditionally not targeted 
Table 9.1  Labor Market Activities and School Enrollment among 18-24-Year-Olds 
~  ~~ 
School Enrollmentb 
Labor Market 
Year  Unemploymentd  Employmentb  Ages 16-19  Ages 20-24  Programsb 
1970  2.5  66.9  38.4  12.8  n.a. 
1990  3.5  75.1  46.4  11.1  2.1 
1993  19.1  49.5  63.2  18.9  10.4 
1995  18.9  49.1  65.0  21.7  7.4 
Sources: Labor Force Surveys, Statistics Sweden, and Thoursie (1996) 
=Percentage  of labor force. 
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particularly at unemployed youths, but this changed as early as the mid- 
1980s. By  1993, 10 percent of 18-24-year-olds  were enrolled in various la- 
bor market programs. 
Another group that was hit very hard by the slump in the Swedish econ- 
omy in the 1990s was immigrants. Unemployment rates among recent im- 
migrants (foreign citizens) are much higher than among Swedish citizens. 
Whereas average unemployment among 20-24-year-olds  increased from 3 
to 17 percent between 1990 and 1994, unemployment among foreign citi- 
zens in this age group rose from 6 to 30 percent. Unemployment among 
recent immigrants aged 35-44  was as high as 20 percent in 1994. 
The depression that hit the Swedish economy in the early  1990s has 
affected all age groups and all educational groups. Unemployment among 
16-24-year-olds  increased  by  a  factor  of  five  whereas  unemployment 
among 35-44-year-olds  increased by  a factor of six. The ratio between 
youth (16-24)  and adult (35-44)  unemployment was 3.7 in  1990 and 2.9 
in 1993. The ratio between low-education (compulsory schooling) unem- 
ployment and university unemployment stood at 2.5 in 1990 and at 2.4 in 
1993. Indeed, there is considerable evidence from a number of countries 
that unemployment relativities for age and educational groups are fairly 
stable over the business cycle. (See Nickel1 and Bell 1994 for evidence and 
interpretations.) 
9.3  Labor Market Outcomes in the 1980s and the 1990s 
9.3.1  Labor Market Status among Disadvantaged Youths 
To provide a somewhat more detailed background for our discussion 
of disadvantaged youth in the  1980s and  1990s, we  start by  describing 
the main trends in employment and nonemployment for various age-ed- 
ucation groups since 1971. We choose to concentrate on males to abstract 
from the massive increase in female labor force participation during the 
period in question. 
Since 1971 a number of major changes may have affected the youth labor 
market. The combination of (1) an increasingly selected group that do  not 
stay on at school, (2) adverse labor demand shifts, and (3) pay compression 
could have created a large increase in joblessness among disadvantaged 
youths. Some evidence on this issue is presented in figure 9.1, where we 
graph  employment-population  rates for males of different  ages (16-19, 
20-24,  and 35-44)  with different levels of schooling (no high school, one 
or two years of high school, and three or four years of high school).’ 
These  graphs  have  two  striking  features.  The first  is  the  dramatic 
2.  The corresponding graphs for unemployment-population  rates and nonparticipation 
rates appear in the appendix. A. 16-19years 
1 
I 
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Fig. 9.1 
Source:  Labor Force Surveys. 
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development of the 1990s; the second is the absence of strong long-run 
trends in employment. The only trend in the data is for teenagers (with no 
high school). Employment rates fall rather steadily for this group with the 
exception of the boom in the late 1980s. The reason for this trend seems 
to be the increased school enrollment of teenagers with no previous high 
school education (see table 9.1 above). Apart from this it seems difficult 
to discern any sizable long-run trends in these data. Edin, Harkman, and 
Holmlund (1995) contains a more detailed analysis of these data in terms 
of employment and nonemployment for different parts of the skill distribu- 
tion, and they come to similar conclusions. Apart from the teenagers, there 
is very little evidence of increasing inequality in employment outcomes. 
The patterns of employment and nonemployment rates in the Swedish 
labor market are not easily interpreted in terms of the popular hypothesis 
about global pervasive trends in labor demand that are particularly harm- 
ful for less skilled workers. The empirical work reported  in  Edin et al. 
(1995) documents some trend increase in nonemployment among the less 
skilled, and some increase in mismatch. These trends are exclusively driven 
by  deteriorating labor market performance among 16-1 9-year-olds. Em- 
ployment rates among prime-aged men in the bottom decile of the wage 
distribution were roughly constant during the period 1971-91.  This stabil- 
ity is in marked contrast to the sharp fall in employment rates among the 
least skilled men in  the US. labor market  (see Juhn, Murphy, and To- 
pel 1991). 
One might speculate that the growth of the Swedish public sector has 
counteracted  negative  relative  demand  shifts  for  low-skilled  workers, 
thereby being particularly helpful for the less skilled in the labor market. 
The share of public employment in the labor force increased from 20 per- 
cent in the early 1960s to almost 40 percent in the mid-1980s. Public sector 
employment increased by 4 to 5 percent per year during the 1970s, with 
almost all of the expansion taking place in the local government sector. Is 
there any evidence that low-skilled workers who have been priced out of 
the private sector have been employed by  the rapidly expanding public 
sector? The fact is that the public  sector  does not employ many  low- 
educated men (see Edin and Holmlund 1994 for further discussion). The 
number of men in the public sector with only basic (compulsory) educa- 
tion has been around 40,000 to 50,000 during the past  20 years, to be 
compared with over one million low-educated men in the private sector 
during the 1970s (and over 600,000 in the early 1990s). It does not seem 
very plausible that the expanding public sector  has been an important 
alternative employer for low-skilled men who have lost their jobs in the 
private ~ector.~ 
3. The role of the public sector is much larger for women. Between 1971 and 1984, female 
employment grew by  39 percent. Expansion of the public sector accounted for 96 percent 
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9.3.2  Labor Market Outcomes and Socioeconomic 
Background in the 1980s and the 1990s 
We will in this section portray labor market outcomes among Swedish 
youths at age 22 by means of data sets from 1986 and 1995. During those 
two years, Statistics Sweden made surveys among those who left the com- 
pulsory nine-year school seven years earlier, in 1979 and 1988. The respon- 
dents were asked in detail about their present labor market situation, and 
to some degree about their labor market history in the past few years. The 
data for 1995 include information on parental socioeconomic background 
as well  as immigrant status; the data for 1986 do not have this informa- 
ti~n.~ 
We begin by looking at labor market status in 1995, which allows us to 
examine the role of  parental background and immigrant status. We esti- 
mate linear probability models for ease of interpretation and focus on five 
states in February 1995: (regular) employment, unemployment, labor mar- 
ket programs, education, and nonparticipation. The results are reported 
in table 9.2. The first column for each case only includes parental charac- 
teristics in addition to gender and immigrant status; the second includes 
in addition the high school choice of the re~pondent.~  The results suggest 
that parental background does matter for labor market outcomes. These 
results become  somewhat weaker but are still strongly  significant when 
education is accounted for. This suggests that parental effects work partly 
through educational choice. The effects of parental background are very 
strong for employment and education, much weaker for unemployment 
and nonparticipation, and of no importance for program participation. 
What  do these  estimates  say  about the  situation  for  disadvantaged 
youths? The results here are not quite clear-cut. First, if we define disad- 
vantaged youths by parents’ skill, We  find that youths with blue-collar par- 
ents (SEI-I  and -2) are not worse off on all dimensions. They have lower 
school enrollment rates and possibly somewhat higher unemployment, at 
least when we do not control for education, but they have higher employ- 
ment rates. A similar pattern is true also for youths with farmer parents 
(SEI-8). Their lower school enrollment  is offset by  higher employment 
rates. 
Second, as could be expected, the situation of youths from immigrant 
backgrounds  seems  quite  problematic.6 Lower  employment  rates  and 
higher unemployment rates are only partly offset by higher school enroll- 
ment. Furthermore, the higher school enrollment rate disappears when we 
4. For further information on the data, see Statistics Sweden (1987, 1996). 
5. We  choose to use high school curriculum instead of highest level of schooling as our 
education variable, since a majority of those choosing to continue to college have not gradua- 
ted by  the date of the survey. Most of those who attend college have a three-year theoretical 
high school degree. 
6. Immigrant background is defined as having both parents born abroad. Table 9.2  Labor Market Status by Family Background and Education, February 1995 
Employment  Unemployment  Programs 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  ,447  ,309  ,108  ,044  ,044  ,041 
(34.2)  (20.3)  (12.67)  (4.42)  (9.22)  (7.18) 
Female  -  ,048  -  ,036  -  ,046  -  ,043  -.017  -.017 
(4.72)  (3.59)  (6.91)  (6.60)  (4.73)  (4.54) 
Foreign citizen  -.I08  -  ,062  ,026  ,040  ,005  ,006 
(10.12)  (5.76)  (3.73)  (5.67)  (I .20)  (1 .57) 
Fumily buckground 
SEI-I  ,167  ,111  ,039  ,014  -  ,003  -  ,005 
(10.78)  (7.13)  (3.86)  (1.38)  (.60)  (W 
SEI-2  .I72  .I12  .044  .025  -  ,003  -  ,006 
(  10.45)  (6.82)  (4.06)  (2.30)  (.56)  (.91) 
SEI-3  ,151  .I 18  ,009  ,000  -  ,004  -  ,005 
(7.95)  (6.29)  (.73)  (.01)  (.60)  (.79) 
SEI-4  ,069  ,054  ,011  ,013  -  .007  -  ,009 
(4.09)  (3.25)  (.98)  (1.19)  (1.21)  (1.39) 
SEI-5 (omitted)  0  0  0  0  0  0 
SEI-6  -  ,074  -  .008  -.013  ,014  ,037  -  ,035 
(-.75)  (W  (.lo)  (.22)  (I  .02)  (.96) 
Nonparticipation 
Education  (excl. education) 
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Nore: Linear probability models. The family background socioeconomic indicators (SEI) are as follows: (I) unskilled blue-collar worker; (2) skilled blue-collar 
worker; (3) white-collar worker,  lower level; (4) white-collar worker, intermediate level; (5) white-collar worker,  upper level; (6) self-employed professional; 
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control  for  high  school choice. Even  if  youths from  immigrant back- 
grounds do worse than “native” youths, their situation seems reasonably 
good compared with recent immigrants (see Wadensjo 1996). One should 
bear in mind that the group of “immigrants” we have in our sample have 
completed  Swedish compulsory  school  and spent  several  years  in  the 
country. 
Finally, we note that youths who decided not to go on to high school 
experience a tough situation in the labor market. Their high unemploy- 
ment rates and low school enrollment rates are not much compensated by 
higher employment rates. This group also has a substantially higher rate of 
nonparticipation. Also, it seems that youths who choose vocational high 
schools or short theoretical  high schools are worse off than those who 
choose long theoretical high schools, even if these differences are smaller 
than those between no high school and long theoretical high schools. 
We have also undertaken a direct comparison of labor market outcomes 
in  1986 and 1995. In addition to gender, we  include dummies for early 
education (whether the individual continued to high school and the type 
of high school education). The education variable is the only measure of 
skill that is available in both samples. The estimates of linear probability 
models for employment, unemployment, education, and nonparticipation 
in one week in February 1986 and one week in February 1995 are shown 
in table 9.3.7 
Once  again  the  results  suggest  that  early  schooling  decisions  are 
strongly associated with labor market outcomes for youths. Youths with 
no or short high school education have higher unemployment rates, lower 
schooling rates, and higher rates of nonparticipation. However, they also 
have higher employment rates. The labor market situation for youths has 
of course deteriorated substantially between 1986 and 1995. It is still true 
that low-skilled youths have higher unemployment and nonparticipation 
rates as well as lower rates of school enrollment. It is unclear, though, to 
what extent the  1990s crisis has hit low-skilled youths more than other 
youths. Low-skilled youths have reduced their school enrollment and in- 
creased their rates of nonparticipation, but the development of employ- 
ment and unemployment rates may be interpreted  somewhat differently. 
Youths with no high school have about  18 percentage point higher em- 
ployment rates than youths with long theoretical high school in both 1986 
and 1995. The entire fall in youth employment between these years is at- 
tributed to a shift in the intercept. Thus high-skilled youths experienced 
a larger relative drop in their employment rate, since they had a lower 
employment rate initially. 
7. Employment programs organized by  the labor market agency are included in regular 
employment. These were not reported separately in 1986, when they accounted for about  1 
percent of the sample (SCB 1996). Table 9.3  Labor Market Status by Education, February 1986 and February 1995 
Nonparticipation 
Employment  Unemployment  Education  (excl. education) 
1986  I995  1986  1995  1986  1995  1986  1995  Variable 
Constant  ,564 
(49.59) 
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Low-skilled youths have experienced a larger absolute increase in their 
unemployment  rate than high-skilled youths. The unemployment differ- 
ential between no high school and long theoretical high school increased 
from 6 to 12 percentage points between  1986 and 1995. However, this in- 
crease is less striking in relative terms. The unemployment rate for youths 
with long theoretical high school also more than doubled during this pe- 
riod (from 2.5  to 5.7 percent). Thus the pattern of stable unemployment 
relativities observed across educational groups in aggregate data also ap- 
pears within this group of youths. 
The estimates reported  above refer to a snapshot of the labor market 
situation of two cohorts at age 22 at different  points in time with  very 
different overall labor market conditions. To get some idea of the dynam- 
ics of labor market entry, we summarize in table 9.4 the labor force status 
of each cohort by six-month periods for two and a half years prior to the 
interview. The respondents were asked to report their main activity by six- 
month period. Here we  report these data for the full samples. The same 
exercise for low-skilled (no high school) youths tells a similar story. 
Apart from large differences in levels across years, there is a striking 
difference in the development over time across cohorts. In the 1980s there 
is a strong and steady increase in employment rates over time-from  59 
percent in fall  1983 to 71 percent in fall  1985. There is no such trend in 
the 1990s. The employment rate actually falls early on to recover during 
Table 9.4 
A. 1986 Sample 
Labor Market Status by  Six-Month Period, 1980s versus 1990s (percent) 
Fall 1983  Spring 1984  Fall 1984  Spring 1985  Fall 1985 
Employment  59.3  62.2  66.8  69.1  71.3 
Unemployment  4.6  3.2  3.6  2.8  3.6 
Education  15.6  16.3  17.4  17.4  18.2 
Nonparticipation 
Programs  4.5  3.4  2.0  1.7  1.2 
(excluding 
education)  14.9  14.1  8.5  7.7  5.4 
B. 1995 Sample 
Fall 1992  Spring 1993  Fall 1993  Spring 1994  Fall 1994 
Employment  40.6  38.4  39.5  41.4  44.9 
Programs  12.8  14.8  12.8  14.0  9.7 
Unemployment  7.8  8.8  10.8  8.2  9.3 
Education  22.3  22. I  22.9  23.3  24.8 
Nonparticipation 
(excluding 
education)  13.3  13.0  11.0  10.4  7.7 The Swedish Youth Labor Market in Boom and Depression  369 
the last year and a half. The long-run consequences of these problems of 
entering the labor market for the 1990 cohort will probably depend cru- 
cially on what alternative routes of entering the labor market they have 
access to. The table illustrates that the lower employment rates (26 per- 
centage points) are “compensated” for mainly by higher participation in 
public employment programs (8 points), higher unemployment rates (6 
points), and higher school enrollment rates (7 points). 
The notion that unemployment can have serious long-run consequences 
for youths is probably not controversial. The question  is then whether 
participation in public employment  programs or regular education can 
counteract these negative effects. We will return to a discussion of labor 
market programs in section 9.4. Concerning the effects of increased school 
enrollment  rates we  have no direct evidence. Judging from the type of 
education these youths enroll in-all  of the increase is in regular college 
and university education-it  is plausible that increasing education has a 
counteracting effect. 
9.3.3  Evidence on Wage Behavior 
To  what  extent has the  slump  been  associated  with  widening  wage 
differentials  among age and educational categories? We have used data 
from two surveys, augmented with information on wages based on the 
respondents’ own reports, to estimate standard wage equations with age 
and education dummies. The surveys are the Household Market and Non- 
market Activities (HUS)8 and the Labor Force Survey (AKU); the latter 
is undertaken by Statistics Sweden and has included questions on wages in 
later years. The wage data in the AKU seem to  be plagued with substantial 
measurement errors. The standard deviation of log hourly wages in the 
1991 sample is about twice the size ofthat reported by Edin and Holmlund 
(1995) from the HUS data for the same year. A comparison of the 90th 
and 10th wage percentiles, however, shows an almost identical differential. 
In the empirical analysis below we  report  only estimates from  samples 
where we have excluded the top and bottom percentiles. There is also some 
evidence that self-reported schooling levels in the AKUs tend to overstate 
actual schooling. On the whole, however, we believe that the AKU data 
should say something about changes over time in the wage structure, even 
if one should be careful in interpreting the magnitude of various wage 
differentials using these data. 
Estimated relative wages of youths are presented in table 9.5. Since the 
earlier HUS teenage estimates are based on 18-19-year-olds, we  report 
AKU estimates for both 16-19-  and 18-19-year-olds.  The teenage relative 
wages tend to  vary across years, but there is no clear change between 1991 
and  1994. The relative wages of  young  adults (ages 20-24)  are  stable 
8. For a description, see Klevmarken and Olovsson (1993). 370  Per-Anders Edin, Anders Forslund, and Bertil Holmlund 
Table 9.5  Youth Relative Wages 
Age 16-19  vs. Age 35-44 
HUS  AKU  AKU 
Age 20-24  vs. 
Age 35-44 
Year  Ages 18-19  Ages 16-19  Ages 18-19  HUS  AKU 
I984  ,156  -  -  .80  - 
1986  .so  -  -  .80  - 
1988  .I6  -  -  .83  - 
1991  .I4  .67  .I2  .8  1  .82 
1992  -  .68  .69  -  .82 
1993  .I6  .79  -  .82 
1994  .75  .I4  ~  .8  1 
- 
- 
Note: All entries are based on regressions with education and gender controls. The HUS 
estimates are reproduced from Edin and Holmlund (1995). 
around 80 percent. The overall impression is that the results do not indi- 
cate any relative wage adjustments for potentially disadvantaged youths 
during the major slump in the early 1990s. 
9.4  Labor Market Programs and Youth Employment: 
Crowding In or Crowding Out? 
In the previous section, we saw that much of the rise in nonemployment 
among youth is accounted for by  an increase in participation in active 
labor market programs (ALMPs). This raises a question about the effects 
of ALMPs on regular employment. This is the main theme of the present 
section. We begin by giving very brief background information on Swedish 
ALMPs in general and programs targeted at youths in particular, as well 
as some figures describing the volume of the programs. We then present 
some new evidence on the effects of ALMPs targeted at youths on regular 
youth employment. 
Over the years since the 195Os, when the foundations of modern Swed- 
ish ALMPs were laid down, a large number of different measures have 
been used. The programs are financed by the central government and im- 
plemented by  the central  Labor Market Board and its regional  bodies. 
Apart  from  the  public  employment  service,  Swedish  ALMPs can  be 
broadly  classified  as  employment  creation,  training,  and  mobility- 
enhancing  measures.’  The two principal  programs that  have been  em- 
ployed over the whole period since the 1950s are temporary public sector 
jobs, called relief work, and labor market training. During the first half of 
the 1980s these programs were supplemented by  a number of new pro- 
9. Since the volumes of mobility-enhancing measures have been very modest since the 
1960s and since displacement is hardly an issue related to these programs, we will not discuss 
them here. The Swedish Youth Labor Market in Boom and Depression  371 
Table 9.6  Youth Participation in Labor Market Programs, 1978-93 
Labor  Temporary  Job 
Relief  Market  Replacement  Introduction  Youth 
























































762  9,617 
3,805  29,738 

















Source: Skedinger (1995). 
grams, one of which was explicitly targeted at youths. In the wake of rap- 
idly  growing unemployment  in  the early  1990s, participation  in  many 
programs (the most notable exception being relief work)’O has grown con- 
siderably, and a number of new measures have been introduced. 
Before 1984, the dominant measure for youths in terms of participation 
was relief work (see table 9.6). Since their introduction in 1984 in the form 
of “youth teams,” which provided teenagers with half-time employment 
and encouraged job seeking, special youth measures have taken a number 
of forms. After a few years, youth teams were succeeded by “job introduc- 
tion” schemes, providing work experience for teenagers. As is evident from 
table 9.6, these programs had a rather modest volume. In  1992, a form 
called “youth practice” was introduced  at the same time as the volume 
was increased rapidly. 
Youth practice is targeted at youths under age 25. The objective is to 
provide the participants with practice and professional experience. The 
introduction  of this measure was accompanied by  instructions aimed at 
minimizing displacement (participants should not replace ordinary recrui- 
tees; the measure is to be seen as a “measure of last resort”). The employer 
receives free labor, whereas the participant receives a grant. The normal 
duration is six months. A final thing to note about the program is that it, 
10. This is a notable exception, because relief work traditionally has been the prime mea- 
sure used to deal with cyclical swings in the labor market. 372  Per-Anders Edin, Anders Forslund, and Bertil Holmlund 
in contrast to previous measures, primarily is directed to  the private sector. 
The number of studies dealing with  displacement  effects of Swedish 
ALMPs is small, and the number of those dealing explicitly with youth 
measures even smaller. The main thrust of these studies is that the dis- 
placement effect of job creation programs is significant, estimates ranging 
between 40 percent and more than 100 percent.”  The results of the two 
studies explicitly treating youth measures are no exceptions. 
Skedinger (1995) uses quarterly data for the period 1970:3-91:4 to esti- 
mate a VAR  including youth (ages 18-24)  participation in labor market 
programs and youth employment. The derived impulse-response function 
implies more than 100 percent crowding out during the first quarter and 
significant crowding out for two quarters. Skedinger’s results have been 
questioned by, among others, Holmlund (1995), who shows that a reason- 
able reformulation of the VAR gives an estimated displacement of around 
40 percent, rather than above 100 percent. Still, this is significant crowding 
out. Forslund (1996) analyzes a panel of the Swedish municipalities for 
the period 1990-94. His estimates indicate that youth programs crowd out 
95 percent of total employment in the short run and about 75 percent in 
the long run. 
To throw more light on the effects of youth measures on regular youth 
employment, we  use the data set constructed by  Forslund (1996) to esti- 
mate a model of the demand for youth labor. The dependent variable is 
the employment-population  share of youths aged  18-24.  In addition to 
time dummies, the right-hand-side variables include the lagged dependent 
variable to take care of sluggish adjustment, the adult employment rate to 
control for  “aggregate” employment shocks, an index for municipality- 
specific labor demand for youth, and the (average annual) labor income 
of youth as a proxy for the youth wage rate. We also include the participa- 
tion rate in youth measures, which is the fraction of the population aged 
18-24  that is enrolled in a youth program. Finally, we include the youth 
share of the population in the age interval  18-65  to control for relative 
supply  effects to the extent  that  these are imprecisely captured  by  the 
youth income variable. All variables are available for all Swedish munici- 
palities for the years 1990-94. 
Most variables are straightforward, but the demand variable warrants 
some explanation. Time dummies are used in the estimations to control for 
aggregate demand shifts, but to purge the estimates of spurious correlation 
between municipality employment and youth programs, we  want to con- 
trol for municipality-specific shifts in the demand for youths. The variable 
is constructed in the following way: the industry distribution of youth em- 
ployment by municipality in 1990 is used to  generate municipality-specific 
11. The studies  include Gramlich and Ysander (1981), Forslund and  Krueger (1997), 
Calmfors and Skedinger (1995), Ohlsson (1995), and Forslund (1996). The Swedish Youth Labor Market in Boom and Depression  373 
Table 9.7 
Variable  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Sample Means of Variables in Estimated Model, 1990-94 
Youth income  89,200  93,400  97,700  99,100  97,000 
Youth employment rate  ,749  .670  ,537  ,434  ,462 
Adult employment rate”  ,649  .626  ,598  ,558  ,562 
Demand index  5.49  5.34  5.09  4.78  4.96 
Youth population shareb  ,155  ,151  ,148  ,145  .  I42 
Youth programs  ,004  .013  ,032  .082  ,083 
aNumber of employed over age 24 relative to population over age 24. 
bPopulation aged 18-24  relative to population aged 18-65. 
weights. The demand index is constructed by applying these weights to the 
aggregate employment development  in each of about 60 industries and 
dividing by the number of youths in each of the years. 
The model is estimated in fixed-effect form. The presence of the lagged 
dependent variable as well as measurement errors and simultaneity prob- 
lems caution against OLS estimation. Thus, in addition to estimating the 
model by  OLS on within-group transformed data, we  have used the IV 
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) implemented in the OX program 
DPD (Arellano, Bond, and Doornik 1997). 
The major simultaneity problem in this study, as well as in other studies 
of displacement, is related to the reasonable hypothesis that programs are 
adjusted in response to the labor market situation. A negative correlation 
between youth employment and youth program participation,  thus, may 
as well reflect this policy reaction as crowding out. Instrumenting is one 
way to deal with this problem. Another way that we  have used is related 
to  the dating of the variables. Employment is measured in November each 
year, whereas program participation is measured as a twelve-month aver- 
age preceding November. 
Another reason to introduce instruments is the presence  of the adult 
employment rate in the equation. To the extent that both youth and adult 
employment are driven by common shocks, this will introduce bias into 
OLS estimates. The choice of instruments for the adult employment rate 
is based on the estimates in Forslund (1996).12 The main instrument  for 
the youth program variable in addition to its own lag is the lagged unem- 
ployment rate, because it is known that the allocation of resources to labor 
market programs is based on the past unemployment history of a region. 
The sample means of the data are presented in table 9.7, and the pre- 
ferred estimated models are presented  in table 9.8.  Looking at the data 
in table 9.7,  some tendencies  are worth  noting.  First, the fall in youth 
employment is dramatic: the youth employment rate falls from just below 
12. See the note to table 9.8 for a list of all instruments used in the GMM estimations. Table 9.8  Estimated Models of Youth Employment 
Variable 
1: OLS Within-Group  2: GMM Estimates  3: Alternative GMM  4: GMM Estimates 
Estimates of Basic  of Basic Dynamic  Estimates of  of Static 
Dynamic Model  Model  Dynamic Model  Model 
Lagged dependent variable  ,482 
(14.75) 
Demand index  ,218 
(2.18) 
Adult employment rate  1.658 
(13.66) 
Youth income  -.I03 
(- 1.573) 
Youth programs  -  ,006 
(-1.71) 
Youth population share  -.I56 
(-1.82) 









-  ,057 















-  .079 
(-4.76) 
-  ,562 
(- 2.88) 
,049 
Note: The number of municipalities is 284. The estimation period is  1991-94  for models  1 and 4,  1992-94  for models 2 and 3. Time dummies are used in 
all models to control for aggregate variables. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All variables are in natural logarithms. The instruments used are the 
lags of the dependent variable, the demand index, the youth employment share, the unemployment rate (by municipality), the population share of the elderly 
(over age 65), the population share of children (under age 18),  average incomes, youth incomes, employment-creating labor market programs (excluding 
youth programs), retraining programs, and demand index for total employment. The ordinary least squares (OLS) standard errors are two-step, heteroscedas- 
ticity-consistent  estimates. All general method of moments (GMM) models pass the usual tests: absence of  second-order serial correlation and a Sargan 
test for instrument validity. The reported f-values  in the GMM estimations are based on the second-step standard errors, which are known from Monte 
Carlo studies to be biased downward for a number of data-generating processes, see Bergstrom (1997). The Swedish Youth Labor Market in Boom and Depression  375 
75 percent in  1990 to around 45 percent in  1993 and 1994. This fall is 
much more pronounced than the corresponding fall in the adult employ- 
ment rate. Second, the fraction of youths in youth programs rises drasti- 
cally from below half a percent in  1990 to above 8 percent in  1993 and 
1994. 
The estimated modelI3 pass specification tests at conventional levels,I4 
and the signs of the point estimates are the expected ones (with the excep- 
tion of the negative coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in model 
3). Thus we find an insignificant negative effect of youth income (which 
proxies the youth wage rate), an insignificant positive effect of municipal- 
ity-specific demand, a negative effect of youth population share, and, most 
important for our present purposes, a significant negative effect of youth 
programs on relative youth employment. It is also instructive to note that 
the estimates of the elasticity of the youth employment rate with respect 
to the adult employment rate fall between a bit below 2 (the OLS  estimate) 
and just above 2.5, thus confirming that youth employment is indeed more 
volatile than the employment of adults. 
Leaving the OLS estimates aside, the reported short-run elasticities of 
youth  employment with  respect to youth  programs fall between  -.056 
and -  .079 and seem rather robust to at least small changes in model speci- 
fication (compare models 2,3, and 4). Noting that the point estimate effect 
of the lagged variable is very close to zero, implying rapid adjustment, the 
long-run effects virtually coincide with their short-run counterparts.I5 A 
change in program participation from, say, 3 to 9 percentt6  would then be 
expected to drive down youth employment by between 6.2 and 8.7 percent 
(taking the two extreme estimates of the elasticity), or between 3.5 and 4.9 
percentage points. Thus the estimates provide evidence for the hypothesis 
that youth measures may actually have made a significant contribution to 
the fall in youth employment between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. 
Looking at the development in the sample, the fall in the youth employ- 
ment rate between 1990 and 1994 is 28.7 percentage points. The estimates, 
taken at face value, ascribe between  12.5 and 17.7 of these percentage 
points, or around half of the fall, to the expansion of youth programs. 
13. With the exception of the OLS within-group model, where, in addition to all possible 
simultaneity and other reasons to believe in biased estimates, the residuals are strongly seri- 
ally correlated. 
14. The Sargan test concerns instrument validity and basically tests for correlations be- 
tween instruments and estimated residuals. The estimator relies on absence of  first-order 
serial correlation in the residuals of the model in level form, which translates into absence 
of second-order  serial correlation  in  the estimated residuals, as the model is estimated in 
first-difference form. 
15. The estimate of long-run crowding out derived from model 2, evaluated at  sample 
means, is 76 percent. 
16. These figures would be in the neighborhood of  the actual figures in table 9.8, although 
they actually understate the change between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. 376  Per-Anders Edin, Anders Forslund, and Bertil Holmlund 
9.5  Concluding Remarks 
We have taken a look at the labor market experience of Swedish youths 
during the depression  of the  1990s and  made  some comparisons with 
youth  employment  and unemployment  during earlier decades. For the 
1970s and the  1980s there is not much evidence of deteriorating labor 
market performance among Swedish youths, despite sharply increasing 
youth relative wages (particularly for teenagers). There is no obvious ex- 
planation for the lack of “action” in employment despite the marked pay 
compression. We have considered the role of the public sector as an em- 
ployer of last resort for disadvantaged youths. The support for this hypoth- 
esis is not overwhelming, however. 
The slump in  the  1990s has been  associated  with dramatic increases 
in youth unemployment  and youth participation  in active labor market 
programs. The impact on unemployment rates by age and education has 
been  roughly  proportional,  however;  unemployment  rates  among the 
young and the less skilled have increased most in absolute terms, but the 
relative increases have been  similar across age and educational groups. 
The evolution  of employment  and unemployment does not offer much 
support for the popular hypothesis that the recent rise in unemployment 
is driven by large and pervasive  shifts in the demand for labor by  skill 
attributable  to technological  innovation.  Wage  differentials have  been 
roughly stable during the slump, which also cautions against interpreta- 
tions in terms of adverse labor demand shifts against the young and the 
less skilled. 
The employment crisis has been met by an unprecedented  increase in 
active  labor  market  programs,  in  large  part  targeted  at  unemployed 
youths. The risk is that these programs may crowd out regular youth em- 
ployment, a hypothesis that is supported in our empirical investigation of 
regular youth employment in Swedish municipalities. Of course, participa- 
tion in active labor market programs has potential long-run benefits rela- 
tive to open unemployment, although these have been difficult to confirm 
in the existing evaluation studies (Forslund and Krueger  1997). There is, 
however, an obvious risk that the exceptional volumes of programs in the 
1990s have put them into the region with decreasing marginal returns. A 
strategy for viable employment growth must have other ingredients than 
more of the same active labor market programs. The Swedish Youth Labor Market in Boom and Depression  377 
Appendix 
A. 16-19 years 
C. 35-44  years 
Fig. 9A.1 
Source: Labor Force Surveys. 
Nofe; Levels of schooling are no high school (diumonds), short high school (squares), and 
long high school (triangles). 
Nonparticipation rates for males by age and level of schooling A. 16-19 years 






C. 35-44 years 




Fig. 9A.2  Unemployment-population  rates for males by age and level of schooling 
Source: Labor Force Surveys. 
Note: Levels of schooling are no high school (diumonds), short high school equares), and 
long high school (triangles). The Swedish Youth Labor Market in Boom and Depression  379 
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